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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from which this
appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended). Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is
conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VDI, Section 5 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0X1995 Supp.) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure; this appeal was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to have found that Defendant Heritage's
actions were permitted by the agreement of the parties, Five F's bankruptcy plan or under
the statutes of the State of Utah when Heritage owed Five F a fiduciary duty (which Judge
Eves defined at R. 1127 as "A duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating
one's personal interests to that of the other person," quoting Black's Law Dictionary), and
an obligation of good faith and fair dealing?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,

Plaintiffs Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiff s Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiff's Argument in
Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
2.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to have granted the Defendant Heritage's
motion for directed verdict on the grounds that the actions of Heritage were permitted by
the agreement of the parties or under the statutes of the state of Utah, after having ruled
1

that as a matter of law Heritage did in fact owe Five F a fiduciary duty?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,
Plaintiffs Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiffs Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiff's Argument in
Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
3.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to have ruled that the jury could not have
found that Defendant Heritage's actions violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,

Plaintiff's Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiffs Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiffs Argument in
Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
4.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to have ruled that the jury could not have
found that Defendant Heritage was unjustly enriched?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,

Plaintiff's Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiff's Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiff's Argument in
2

Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
5.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to grant the Defendant Heritage's motion for
directed verdict, and by implication find that in bidding on the second trustee's sale
Heritage was not in derogation of Utah law with regard to deficiency judgments?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,

Plaintiff's Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiff's Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiff's Argument in
Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
6.

Was it reversible error for the District Court to grant the Defendant Heritage's motion for
directed verdict, and by implication presume that Five F could not prevail under any of
its facts?
Preserved for appeal in the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order R. 1-44,

Plaintiff's Oppositions to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment R. 619-768, 1038-1077,
Proposed Pretrial Orders R. 1465-1499, 1701-1735, Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum R. 15221530, during Plaintiff's Opening Argument R. 1823 at 28, and during Plaintiff's Argument in
Opposition of Defendants' Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1825 at 621, 636 and 642, and then in
Opposition to Defendants' Renewed Rule 54(c) Motion R. 1826 at 836.
7.

Based upon the admitted facts, should the trial court be directed to enter judgment finding
that Heritage's admitted actions did in fact violate its fiduciary duties and the covenant of
3

good faith and fair dealing, and grant judgment in favor of Five F and against Heritage for
not less than the $300,000 lost value of the unfairly foreclosed upon four-plex, plus
interest thereon from the date of foreclosure both before and after judgment, and for costs
of suit and attorney's fees, and that the issues of whether additional compensatory and
punitive damages should be awarded be tried before another jury with all of Judge Eves'
other rulings on the law in place.
Standard of Review: Directing a verdict for one party after presentation of the case to the
jury is really a finding of summary judgment in that party's favor- it's a determination that no
fact questions exist for the jury to decide. Thus "the standard of review . . . for a summary
judgment is one of correctness, with no deference afforded to the trial court." Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803
P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Five F is a Utah LLC which at all relevant times operated in St. George, Utah.
Defendant/Appellee Heritage Savings Bank ("Heritage" or Appellee") is a financial institution in
St. George, Utah. On September 12, 1996, the parties entered into a promissory note agreement
wherein Five F was to pay the amount of $1,200,000.00 plus interest by December 31, 1996. In
connection with this loan, Five F executed a trust deed granting Heritage a lien against three
separate parcels of real property as security for Five F's obligations: (a) a 10.44 acre piece of
vacant ground with an appraised value of $1,640,000, (b) a four-plex with an appraised value of
$300,000, and (c) another four-plex with a like appraisal. Consequently, Five F pledged real
property worth $2,200,000 to secure a loan of $1,200,000. Heritage prepared the Note and Trust
4

Deed, and assumed the role of Trustee in the Trust Deed.
Five F made the first two payments under the Note, but then went into default. Five F
then obtained $240,000 in funds and paid off one of the four-plexes, which was released from the
Trust Deed.
Heritage filed a Notice of Default against the 10.44 acres and the four-plexes. After the
one four-plex was released, Five F owed Heritage approximately $1,000,000, plus interest and
some foreclosure costs.
Because the two properties were worth almost $2,000,000, Five F filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy and got a plan approved which gave it some time to try and refinance and/or sell the
property. The plan provided that if Heritage was not paid by a certain date, it could proceed with
its trust deed foreclosure.
Despite much effort on Five F's part, it did not raise the funds to pay Heritage by the date
set forth in the plan, so Heritage noticed up a trustee's sale for the 10.44 acres. Prior to this time,
Heritage had obtained at least two other appraisals: one showing the 10.44 acres was worth
$1,825,000, and another -just prior to the scheduled trustee's sale - showing a value of
$1,380,000. Heritage was owed about $1,300,000 at the time of the scheduled trustee's sale.
Five F anticipated that Heritage would foreclose on the 10.44 acres and the entire debt to
Heritage would be satisfied - since the 10.44 acres was clearly worth more than what was owed
to Heritage at the time. However, at the trustee's sale on July 13, 1998, Heritage only credit bid
$1,090,000. Then, rather than accept the 10.44 acres in complete satisfaction of the debt,
Heritage noticed up a trustee's sale for the four-plex.
Five F filed this action and sought a temporary restraining order, claiming that Heritage
5

should be considered to have been paid in full upon the foreclosure of the 10.44 acres, and that
the scheduled trustee's sale of the four-plex was a defacto attempt to obtain an improper
"deficiency" against Five F. Under Utah trust deed law, if a beneficiary has credit bid against
collateral, it cannot obtain a deficiency judgment unless the "fair market value" of the property
foreclosed upon was less than the debt owed. Since the "fair market value" of the 10.44 acres
(between $1.38 and 1.8 million) was clearly more than the debt owed to Heritage ($1.3 million),
Heritage's attempt to foreclose on the four-plex should be barred. The TRO was denied.
Claiming an unfair and improper $195,000 "deficiency" or "debt" still owed, Heritage
proceeded to foreclose on the four-plex. On August 12,1998, Heritage held a trustee's sale on
the remaining four-plex property and again credit bid lower than what it knew the four-plex was
worth. Heritage had appraisals showing a value in excess of $300,000 - and had a buyer for the
four-plex already lined up for $280,000, but Heritage only bid $210,000 at the trustee's sale.
Eight days later Heritage sold the four-plex property to a third party for $280,000.00.
Heritage claimed that it was still owed more money from Five F, and sought to be paid
$29,000 in rents which had been paid into the bankruptcy from the four-plexes.
So, for a debt of only $1,300,000, Heritage obtained 10.44 acres which it ultimately sold
for $1,685,000, and a four-plex which it immediately sold for $280,000 - for a total of
$1,965,000; which resulted in what Five F believed to have been "unjust enrichment" to Heritage
of over $600,000. Five F came to believe that Heritage had deliberately conspired, by
controlling the bidding and receipt of bidding process, to obtain all of Five F's pledged collateral
rather than just the first 10.44 acres which had more than enough value to satisfy the debt owed.
Hence this lawsuit was filed.
6

Five F initiated this district court action in August, 1998. By its first amended complaint,
in April, 1999, Five F asserted claims against Heritage for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, and unjust enrichment.
Among other things, Five F alleged that Heritage owed Five F a fiduciary duty by acting
simultaneously as trustee and beneficiary under the Trust Deed, as well as a duty to act in good
faith and to deal fairly with Five F. Five F alleged that Heritage breached this duty and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things, (a) bidding and
accepting a credit bid for the 10.44 acres which Heritage had absolute certainty was hundreds of
thousands of dollars less than fair market value, and (b) by then proceeding to foreclose on the
four-plex when Heritage again had absolute certainty that the 10.44 acres which it had acquired
at the trustee's sale was worth much more than Five F's remaining debt. After the 10.44 acres
were foreclosed upon, Five F's debts should have been considered fully paid and cancelled. If
there had been no further real property securing Five F's obligations to Heritage, Heritage would
have been barred by Utah trust deed law from obtaining a deficiency judgment against Five F
given the high fair market value of the 10.44 acres. Five F also alleged that Heritage's greed
caused it to proceed to attempt to thereafter get the $29,000 in rents which had been paid into the
bankruptcy court from the four-plex. Five F alleged among other things that these actions
violated Heritage's duties to protect the interests of the Trustor in the real property.
Heritage answered the first amended complaint and asserted counterclaims for foreclosure
of security interest on the $29,000 in rents and for breach of contract. In September, 2001, one
month before trial, the parties stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, of Defendant's
counterclaim against the $29,000 in rents.
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During the course of this litigation, the defendant filed a motion for leave to amend to
amend its counterclaim. In ruling on this motion, the District Court correctly characterized Five
F's core claims as follows:
"The fair market value for Parcel A [the 10.44 acres] at the time of the first
[trustee's] sale, according to the appraisals that were done on the property, was purported
to be between $1,640,000 and $1,825,000. After the [trustee's] sales, plaintiff [Five F]
brought this action, alleging that defendant [Heritage] should not have been able to hold
the second [trustee's] sale [of the four-plex] because the fair market value of Parcel A
exceeded the amount of the debt. Plaintiff claims that defendant should have credited the
fair market value of Parcel A against the debt, rather than the amount of the credit bid,
and asserts that the debt would have been completely satisfied, leaving the second parcel
of collateral [the four-plex] in the ownership of the plaintiff.... The question raised by
this suit is not whether the lender could look to all the collateral if the loan was repaid.
The question is whether the defendant was paid in full (or should have been paid in full)
after the sale of Parcel A. R. 811-13
"Defendant asserts that if it did indeed have the right to foreclose on the second
parcel, plaintiff has no cause of action. Defendant misses the point of this suit. The
plaintiff does not seek to prohibit the foreclosure of the second parcel of collateral, unless
the sale of the first piece should have satisfied the debt. It is the manner in which the sale
was conducted that is the basis for this suit. Plaintiff asserts that defendant did not have
the right to structure the sale as it did, in order to be able to obtain both parcels of
property. According to plaintiff, defendant was obligated to give a fair market value
offset for Parcel A before proceeding with the sale of the four-plex unit." R. 813-814
Heritage argued that neither the note and trust deed, nor Utah foreclosure law, required it
to credit bid "fair market value," and that it did nothing that was not permitted by those
agreements or that law.
Five F argued that Heritage had a fiduciary duty as both trustee and beneficiary to protect
8

Five F's interest in the collateral, and at the very least not proceed to foreclose on the four-plex
when it knew that the 10.44 acres had sufficient value to satisfy the entire debt.
Five F also argued that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required the same i.e., that when Five F knew that the 10.44 acres had enough value to satisfy the debt, it was bad
faith and unfair dealing to intentionally bid low so as to purport to be able to foreclose on the
four-plex and get another $300,000 in unwarranted value from Five F. It was bad enough for
Heritage to get the 10.44 acres with a value of between $1,625,000 and $1,800,000, but it was
outrageous for Heritage to reach for another $300,000 from the four-plex.
Five F also argued that even if it did not have a claim at law (i.e., under the express terms
of the note and trust deed, or the foreclosure statutes), that it should be able to recover at least the
value of the four-plex ($300,000) under the theory of unjust enrichment.
The District Court denied Heritage's motions for summary judgment and the matter went
to trial before a jury.
At trial, Five F put evidence to support its claims that Heritage did owe Five F a fiduciary
duty, and that Heritage's actions during the foreclosures clearly indicated that Heritage was
deliberately trying to manipulate the system to be able to acquire all of Five F's property - rather
than just enough (actually more than enough) to satisfy the debt. Evidence about the many
appraisals, and Heritage's various incorrect and inflated calculations as to what it was owed by
Five F, and the like, was also adduced.
During the early stage of the trial, Heritage made certain limiting motions, and the Court
commented and/or ruled on the second day of this four day trial as follows:
"Except that this theory, as I understand the theory of the plaintiff in this case it is
9

that this whole deal was unfair to the borrower because the bank recovered much more
money than it was entitled to from the foreclosure of these pieces of property. And
frankly, I haven't been able to find any cases or law that deal with this. But if the, the
theory of the plaintiff is fairness seems to me we ought to go through the whole
transaction in front of the jury and let them decide what's fair. That's what I said
yesterday. The damage calculation would be the amount, if any, by which the recovery
made by the bank by foreclosing on the properties and disposing of them exceeds the
amount that they were owed on the loan, the amount that the plaintiff agreed to pay. I
mean, that's what I thought I said yesterday and I think that's what we are going to, the
way we're going to approach it....
"There's some, there's some interesting ... As we've said many times in this case,
and I don't know if we've said it publicly but the lawyers and I have said it in discussing
the case, that there is a dearth of law in this area. And I've never seen a case such framed
in this way involving the claims that are being brought by the plaintiff in this case. But,
then the whole concept of a, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all
contracts is a relatively recent development in Utah law and so I don't know how it plays
into this case. But it seems to me that what we're dealing with here is an attempt by
plaintiff to establish that somehow the process that was pursued by the bank was unfair to
them....
But I don't think we're challenging the way the sale was conducted necessarily.
We're challenging the fact that the process as it was played out here resulted in, in unfair
prejudice to the plaintiff. The bank realized a windfall is the allegation of the plaintiff.
..." R. 1824 at 177-78,179-80
At the end of Five F's case, Heritage moved for directed verdict under "Rule 54(c)."
After hearing argument, the District Court entered the following rulings in favor of Five F:
"I have reviewed the cases, Blodgett versus Marsh (phonetic), the Banbury
Crossing cases yet again during the recess and considered them in relation to the facts and
the motion made by the defendant in this case under Rule 54(c).
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The first part of that motion dealt with the question of whether or not the plaintiff
had satisfied the elements of establishing a fiduciary duty under the Banbury criteria.
I think that in a sense is not the issue here. The question is whether or not the relationship
between the parties was a fiduciary relationship given the facts.
In Blodgett versus Marsh (phonetic) there is cited various jurisdictions including
District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri and California which have
already adopted the proposition that a trust deed in and of itself creates a fiduciary
relationship.
In this case the trustee wasn't just involved in a trust relationship with the trustor,
that trustee was also the beneficiary. And while that was permitted under Utah law at the
time of these events, it creates in the opinion of the court, a higher duty on the part of the
trustee/beneficiary in its conduct toward the trustor.
I now hold that under the facts of this case and as a matter of law the bank acting
in the capacity of both trustee and beneficiary was in a fiduciary relationship with the
trustor.
I understand that that's a step further than the Supreme Court has gone but I think
they went to the brink of that and then didn't, didn't say it.
That opinion I think is buttressed by my reading of Banbury Crossing in which the
Utah Supreme Court held that quote:
"The existence of the trust'..., in that case a trust deed,...' creates a duty between
the trustee and the beneficiary."
And then went on to say that the trustee cannot ignore the trustor's rights and
interests in carrying out its duty to the, to the beneficiary. That sounds like a fiduciary
relationship to me and I'm going to so hold.
So I think the evidence is sufficient to establish as a matter of law and, therefore,
as a matter of fact that this is a fiduciary relationship.
Now with regard to the, the other parts of the motion relating to the breach of the
implied covenant. I've considered those. I'm not persuaded that I should dismiss that
cause of action.
11

The first point made is that you can't, that you can't have an implied covenant that
conflicts with the contract in this case. I don't see the conflict. In fact, I see the difficulty
that has created this situation is that the contract isn't clear on the subject of what happens
if the bank's recovery under the foreclosure process exceeds what they are entitled to
under the contract. That isn't covered. And so the question, I think the issue is then is
the bank required to treat the borrower fairly in that circumstance.
So I'm not suggesting there's a conflict. I'm suggesting that that isn't clear in the
contract.
Likewise I'm not trying to establish a better contract for the parties than they made
for themselves. As I understand it what the plaintiff is seeking here and what we'll ask
the jury to decide is whether or not the parties conducted themselves as they were
required to under the existing contract, and in so doing whether there was fair treatment
involved. I don't view that as a better contract.
In fact, the contract doesn't cite 57-1-28(2). So to that extent if I were to include
that statute in the contract I'd be making a better contract for the bank than they made for
themselves.
So I'm not going to dismiss that cause of action either." R. 1825 at 644-646

'Oh, if the bank were not the beneficiary I'd agree with you. But the bank was
both. And that I think creates the difficulty, the duty here, the higher duty because they
are both the beneficiary and the trustee. They're allowed to do that. But then you've got
some additional problems, it seems to me, because the same entity who's making all the
loan decisions, making decisions as to what to bid, how payments are going to be
credited, is the same entity that is making decisions as the trustee. And that's why I've
characterized it as I have." R. 1825 at 648
Around Noon the very next day, on Thursday, October 25, 2001, the fourth day of the
trial, the defendants rested their case. The defendants then renewed their motion for directed
verdict. This time the District Court completely reversed direction, and granted the motion in

12

favor of Heritage, ruling as follows:
"It's not appropriate for a Court to weigh the evidence in this case in deciding a
renewed motion for directed verdict since the weighing of evidence is the exclusive
province of the jury.
However, the Court has a duty to decide before submitting the matter to the jury
whether there is evidence before the jury sufficient to allow the jury to determine that the
plaintiff is entitled to prevail on its claims, given the applicable law. This decision is
accomplished by considering every fact and indulging every reasonable inference from
the facts in favor of the plaintiff, and then asking the question assuming all the facts in
this case are as the plaintiff says that they are is there any way that a reasonable jury could
find in the plaintiffs favor under the law.
I've struggled with that process as we have worked through this case and during
this trial because I was not fully advised when the trial started as to all of the details of the
ways in which the plaintiff claimed that bank had breached its fiduciary duty as trustee, or
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or received unjust
enrichment.
Having now heard the evidence along with the jury the Court is able to rule on the
application of the law to that evidence.

After considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the
Court has come to the conclusion that as a matter of law the jury in this case could not
reasonably conclude given the evidence before it that the defendant bank engaged in any
conduct which was not permitted under the agreement of the parties or under the statutes
of this state applicable to this situation.
The steps taken by the bank were allowed by the foreclosure statutes, the order of
the bankruptcy court, and the agreement of the parties.
So the ultimate question in this case turns out to be whether a bank can be found
to violate its fiduciary duty or to have violated its promise to treat the borrower with good
faith and deal with the borrower fairly when the bank does no more than exercise its legal
13

rights under the law.
Given the evidence in this case and which this jury would have to consider, the
Court is of the opinion that the law does not contemplate that the bank can be found liable
to the plaintiff for the breach of fiduciary duty or the breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or for unjust enrichment when the bank's conduct is permitted
under law." R. 1826 at 847-850

Essentially the Court ruled that as a matter of law, neither the fiduciary duty of Heritage
as trustee under the Trust Deed, nor the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, prevented
Heritage from manipulating its trustee's sale bidding process in order to take the $300,000 fourplex away from Five F when the 10.44 acres unquestionably already resulted in Heritage being
paid in full what Five F owed to Heritage.
Five F in this appeal asks this Court of Appeals to reverse the Trial Court and rule that as
a matter of law Heritage's fiduciary duty and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
required Heritage to - as Judge Eves put it - act "fairly" with respect to Five F and to protect
Five F's interests in not losing all of its collateral when the 10.44 acres had enough value to more
than satisfy the debt to Heritage. Alternatively, if the language of the agreements and/or the
foreclosure statutes appear to deny Five F a "legal remedy" against Heritage, Five F asks this
Court to find in equity that Heritage should not be unjustly enriched through this process at Five
F's expense - and/or should be estopped in equity from proceeding to foreclose against the fourplex when the 10.44 acres had in fact more than satisfied the debt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff/Appellant Five F is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of
business in St. George, Utah. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)
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2.

Defendant Heritage Savings Bank is a Utah financial institution with its principal place of
business in St. George, Utah. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

3.

On September 12, 1996, Heritage loaned Five F $1,200,000, and Five F executed a
Promissory Note in favor of Heritage in the amount of $1,200,000. (Amended Proposed
Pretrial Order R. 1538)

4.

The Note was secured by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, through which Five F
conveyed to Heritage as Trustee, title to three parcels of real property, an undeveloped
parcel consisting of 10.44 acres, and two four-plexes. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order
R. 1538)

5.

Prior to closing the loan with Five F, Heritage had received appraisals on the three parcels
of real property pledged to secure the loan (the 10.44-acre parcel of raw land, and the two
four-plexes), in the amounts, respectively, of $1,640,000.00, $306,000.00, and
$306,000.00. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

6.

Mr. Fowler was aware of these appraisals at the time of the closing.

7.

Heritage was the beneficiary and also the Trustee under the Trust Deed, of which Fowler
was aware when he signed the Trust Deed. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

8.

Five F defaulted in its obligations under the Note, by failing to pay all principal and
accrued interest by December 31, 1996, as required by the Note. (Amended Proposed
Pretrial Order R. 1538)

9.

On February 29, 1997, Heritage as Trustee commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure
proceeding against all three parcels of real property by filing a Notice of Default with the
Washington County Recorder. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)
15

10.

At the time of the December 31, 1998 default, Five F owed Heritage on its Note the full
principal amount of approximately $1,200,000 plus interest and costs to be incurred in
foreclosure. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

11.

On March 17, 1998, Five F made a partial payment on the loan of $240,000, in exchange
for reconveyance of one of the two four-plexes. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R.
1538)

12.

Heritage's foreclosure proceeding was interrupted when, on or about May 23,1997, Five
F filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

13.

In connection with the chapter 11 proceeding, Heritage assessed its lien against the real
property securing the Note, as well as the rents collected by Five F from the remaining
four-plex. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

14.

In its chapter 11 bankruptcy case Five F sought and obtained confirmation of a Plan of
Reorganization, which was confirmed by order of the bankruptcy court on February 18,
1998. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

15.

Five F's Plan of Reorganization gave Five F less than three months to pay Heritage in
full, by on or before May 31, 1998, or Heritage could proceed with its foreclosure.
(Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

16.

Five F failed to pay Heritage in full within said approximately three months. (Amended
Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

17.

A trustee's sale was scheduled for and held on the 10.44 acre tract on July 13, 1998.
(Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

18.

Prior thereto, Heritage had obtained two other appraisals for the 10.44 acres - (a) one for
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over $1,800,000, and another for almost $1,400,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order
R. 1538)
19.

At the time of the July 13, 1998 sale, Five F owed Heritage a total of approximately
$1,300,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

20.

Despite knowing that the 10.44 acres was worth somewhere between $1,400,000 and
$1,800,000, Heritage was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale and bid only $1,090,000.
(Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

21.

Neither Five F nor Ray Fowler bid at the sale because they believed that the foreclosure
by Heritage on the 10.44 acres would and did satisfy the entire debt to Heritage.
(Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

22.

Claiming that it was still owed over $195,000 despite the fact that it had just obtained
title to the very valuable 10.44 acres, Heritage soon noticed up a trustee's sale for the
four-plex. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

23.

Five F filed an action and sought a TRO to stop this trustee's sale; which motion and
subsequent petition to the Utah Supreme Court for extraordinary relief were denied.
(Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

24.

On August 12, 1998, Heritage purported to hold a trustee's sale on the four-plex.

25.

Heritage had a buyer for the four-plex lined up prior to August 12, 1998, for a purchase
price of $280,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

26.

At the August 12, 1998 Trustee's sale, Heritage bid only $210,000 when it knew that the
appraised value for the four-plex was $306,000, and it had a buyer lined up ready to close
immediately at $280,000, and acquired the four-plex. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order
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R. 1538)
27.

Heritage sold the four-plex to the third-party buyer that it had lined up prior to the
trustee's sale, on or about August 20,1998 for $280,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial
Order R. 1538)

28.

On October 6, 2000, Heritage sold the 10.44 acres for $1,682,000. (Amended Proposed
Pretrial Order R. 1538)

29.

Because Heritage had again bid low for the four-plex, it claimed that it was still owed
money despite having foreclosed on almost $2,000,000 worth of Five F's real property.
And, all the way up and until one month before the trial herein, Heritage sought to also
foreclose on approximately $29,000 in rents which had been paid into the bankruptcy
from the four-plex. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R. 1538)

30.

Judge Eves defined "fiduciary duty" in a Ruling found at R. 1127 as:
Quoting from Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978): "A course of dealing

between persons so situated [where one owes a fiduciary duty to another] is watched with
extreme jealousy and solicitude, and if there is found the slightest trace of undue influence or
unfair advantage, redress will be given to the injured party. (Citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d 38, Fraud and
Deceit, Section 15.)... The duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater than the mere
obligation to sell th pledged property in accordance with the default provision of the trust deed, it
is to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor."
And then quoting from "Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 625, where
"Fiduciary Duty" is defined as, 'A duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating
one's personal interests to that of the other person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by
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law (e.g., trustee, guardian)"
31.

Heritage's proposed Jury Instruction No. 33 provide the following:
"(Fiduciary Duty-Act in Interest of Another) If Heritage, as trustee, had a fiduciary duty
to Five F, that fiduciary duty required Heritage to act in the interest of Five F." R. 1608

32.

Ray Fowler testified at trial that:
a.

He had shared confidential business plans and other information with Heritage; R.
1824 at 234:3-15; 237:22-238:8; 240:16 - 242:4; 264:15 - 266:15; 1825 at 477:1
-25

b.

Given the well known "golden rule" ("thems thats got the gold, makes the rules"),
Heritage could and did demand from Five F almost anything that Heritage desired
and Five F had to knuckle under or not get the loan. R. 1823 at 86:1 -19, 87:25 88:22, 89:16 - 93:22, 95:3 - 96:6; 1824 at 270:9 -18,307:12 - 309:8,311:24 316:8

c.

Fowler expected and trusted Heritage to nevertheless treat Five F fairly. R. 1823
at 91:24 - 92:11,127:9 - 128:15; 1824 at 216:15 - 218:2,219:23 - 220:11,249:2
- 14, 270:19 - 25, 275:13 - 22

d.

As trustee and beneficiary, Heritage had the power to control and manipulate the
trustee's sale bidding process. R. 1823 at 96:7 - 11,139:13 - 149:10; 1824 at
353:12 - 361:12,406:11 - 407:11; 1825 at 480:14 - 486:13;1826 at 717:23 721:12, 747:12 - 751:15, 755:12 - 757:25

33.

Five F adduced other evidence at trial as to the following:
a.

Heritage had manipulated its "costs" and "balances due" numbers at various times
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to try and claim more money was due than was actually due from Five F. R. 1823
at 114:13 -117:3, 121:2 -124:25,125:5 -126:24,127:9 -129:10; 1824 at
268:10 - 269:19; 181:18 -188:2, 249:17 - 254:3, 271:12 - 23, 319:19 - 353:22,
361:24 - 369:12; 1825 at 470:16 - 476:25,477:12 - 478:23,499:16 - 501:16
b.

It could be fairly inferred from the evidence submitted that Heritage was trying to
"defraud" - i.e., take from - Five F more collateral than would be reasonably
necessary to satisfy the debt to Heritage. R. 1824 at 371:22 - 375:11

c.

The actual amounts by which Five F believed that Heritage had been unjustly
enriched and by which Five F was damaged. R. 1824 at 189:25 - 190:12, 389:1 5; 1825 at 495:12 - 497:14, 505:8 - 552:7, 574:4 - 582:9

34.

Judge Eves made a preliminary ruling that as a matter of law Heritage owed Five F a
fiduciary duty by assuming the role of Trustee under the Trust Deed. R. 1825 at 644-646

35.

Judge Eves also made a preliminary ruling that the relief which Five F sought was not
contrary to or outside the scope of the parties' written agreement. R. 1825 at 644-646

36.

Nevertheless, Judge Eves ruled that as a matter of law neither the fiduciary duty owed by
a trustee/beneficiary to a trustor, nor the covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed by
a bank to a borrower, could require a bank to do more than act consistent with its express
rights under a contract or Utah trust deed foreclosure law. R. 1826 at 847-850

37.

Judge Eves also ruled that Heritage did nothing which was not allowed by the parties'
contracts or Utah trust deed foreclosure law. R. 1826 at 847-850
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Fiduciary Duties Always Impose Obligations in Excess of the Ordinary. Judge Eves
correctly ruled that Heritage did owe Five F a fiduciary duty. But then he took a wrong-turn
when he ruled that Heritage's fiduciary duty to Five F did not impose any heightened duty or
obligation on Heritage to act in Five F's interests. This is wrong because more is always
required of fiduciaries than of non-fiduciaries. A "fiduciary duty" is a "higher" duty - in fact
"the highest" duty imposed by law. It by definition imposes greater obligations upon the party
owing the duty. A fiduciary is routinely prevented from acting in its own interest when that
would be detrimental to the interests of the entity to whom the duty is owed. It was simply
wrong for Judge Eves to rule as a matter of law that the fiduciary duty which Heritage owed to
Five F didn't place any "higher" obligations or duties upon Heritage than those found in the
parties' contract. Heritage's fiduciary duty to Five F would clearly not require Heritage to
foreclose on less property than would be sufficient to fully and fairly satisfy Five F's debt. But
Heritage's fiduciary duty to Five F should clearly have precluded Heritage from proceeding to
foreclose on Five F's four-plex and then pursuing the $29,000 in rents after Heritage had
acquired the 10.44 acres which Heritage knew full well had a value in excess of Five F's debt. If
Heritage had stopped after foreclosing on the 10.44 acres, Heritage would have been left with
from $100,000 to $500,000 in extra value (above and beyond the debt owed), and Five F would
have kept the $300,000 four-plex and not had to expend funds to defend against the attempts to
take the $29,000 in rents. Stopping after the 10.44 acre foreclosure would not have prejudiced
Heritage at all, but would have "protected Five F's interests."
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The Covenant of Fair Dealing Requires Discretionary Actions to be Fair and in
Good Faith. Judge Eves again started out in the correct direction when he ruled that Five F was
not attempting to obtain performance and/or relief from Heritage which was inconsistent with the
parties' agreements. But, again, Judge Eves took a startling and reversible detour when he stated
that it was not bad faith - given the evidence which he was required to assume to be true of
Heritage's intentional pattern of bidding low so as to be able to claim that it was justified in
foreclosing on more and more of Five F's property - for Heritage to in fact knowingly bid low on
the 10.44 acres and then proceed to foreclose on the four-plex when it knew that it had already
received the benefit of its trust deed bargain in the form of the value of the 10.44 acres. Trust
deeds give a beneficiary the right and ability to foreclose on enough collateral to be made whole
- i.e., to be paid in full.

Just because on the face of the documents a party "can" do something,

does not mean that the party "should" do that something. The implied covenant, again, would
not require Heritage to foreclose on less collateral than would be sufficient to satisfy Five F's
debt. But, after Heritage had obtained the 10.44 acres which it knew more than satisfied the debt
owed, it was bad faith and not fair dealing for Heritage to knowingly proceed to foreclose on and take away from Five F - the $300,000 four-plex.

That was simply not "fair play."

Declaring that Heritage "Had the Right" to do What it Did Begged the Question.
Judge Eves' final analysis and ruling granting Heritage its directed verdict begged the essential
question. As a result of Heritage's fiduciary duty to Five F, Heritage had a duty to refrain from
what it otherwise would have been entitled to do in the absence of that duty. It was improper for
Judge Eves to reverse the analysis and undo the finding that Heritage owed a fiduciary duty. It is
illogical to start by saying: in the absence of a fiduciary duty, Heritage would be free to bid low,
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and to then try and foreclose on more property than it was entitled to; and then say that because
Heritage wouldn't have a duty in the absence of the duty, Heritage's fiduciary duty was
eviscerated..
Similarly, you can't start by saying that since the contract doesn't expressly require you to
refrain from dealing unfairly with the other party, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not really impose any duties on the parties to deal fairly and in good faith with each
other.
It was erroneous, therefore, for Judge Eves to start out ruling that "Heritage was allowed
to do what it did on the face of the documents," and to then conclude as a result thereof, that the
Fiduciary duty owed by Heritage would not really require the normal higher duty and/or level of
performance required of a fiduciary; or that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
would not - as to matters not expressly covered in an agreement - really require good faith or fair
dealing with respect to those issues.
The Court should have walked through the front door of the analysis and concluded (a)
because there is a fiduciary duty, there is imposed on the fiduciary a requirement which otherwise
would not exist to act in the interest of the trustor and to not take "unfair advantage" by seeking
to take additional collateral when the debt had already been paid; and (b) because there is implied
in all contracts a covenant to act in good faith and to deal fairly, Heritage was - once it knew that
it had been made whole by the 10.44 acres - required in good faith, and all fairness to Five F, to
cease foreclosing on any more collateral. This is so even if otherwise "on the face" of the
agreements and/or the statutes it would seem like Heritage could keep foreclosing.
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When "Legal Remedies" Fail Equitable Remedies Come Into Play and Demand
That Heritage Disgorge Its Illgotten Gain. Heritage argues that you cannot pursue an
equitable remedy, such as "unjust enrichment," if there is a contract somewhere in the equation.
But, in this case, Heritage argues that Five F does not and can not have a contractual - i.e.,
"legal" - remedy. If there is no contractual provision which expressly governs, then the
principles of equity of necessity come into play. As a fall back position, since the Trial Court
ruled as a matter of law that Five F had no remedy under its Fiduciary Duty or
Contractual/Implied Covenant claims, then Five F should nevertheless have been allowed to seek
in the alternative equitable relief against Heritage. Under the undisputed facts, Heritage was
unjustly enriched as to at least the value of the $300,000 four-plex. It was simply not equitable
for Five F to lose the value of that four-plex, and for Heritage to have received it.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Fiduciary Duty Owed by Heritage to Five F Required Heritage to Refrain From
Doing What Heritage Would Have Otherwise Been Permitted to do Under the
Parties' Agreement and the Law if Those Otherwise Permitted Actions Would be
Against The Interests of Five F
The issue of whether Heritage owed Five F a fiduciary duty was decided on the third day

of trial - Judge Eves expressly found that Heritage did owe such a duty to Five F as a matter of
law and based upon the facts. The question then was whether or not this fiduciary duty would
preclude Heritage from taking steps which it otherwise - in the absence of the duty - would have
been freely permitted to take under the parties' agreements and the law. Judge Eves erroneously
ruled as a matter of law that it did not. The law and cases as to what is required of an entity
which owes a fiduciary duty are clear and require the reversal of Judge Eves on this point.
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Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 625, defines "Fiduciary Duty" as, "A duty to
act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other
person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by law (e.g., trustee, guardian)"
In Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d 298, 302 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court stated
that:
"[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater than the mere obligation to sell
pledged property in accordance with the default provisions of the trust deed instrument, it
is to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor .... the ease
and facility of foreclosure under [the trust deed foreclosure statute] commends it over the
more cumbersome form of mortgage which must be foreclosed in court, but this very fact
imposes upon courts the duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it which are questioned,
and of setting those aside in which fraud or overreaching has been practiced by the
trustee."
[citations omitted]
The Court continued on in its opinion to give guidance to the trial court on remand, that the duty
of the trustee to the trustor, "was to act with reasonable diligence and good faith on [the trustor's]
behalf consistent with [the trustee's] primary obligation to assure the payment of the secured
debt." See id. At 303

From this guidance, it is clear that once a trustee becomes certain that the

obligation to the beneficiary has in fact been satisfied, the trustee's duty clearly shifts exclusively
to protect the trustor from any further harm. In fact, under the language of the trust deed, once
the debt has been satisfied, the trustee has a duty to release and reconvey the trust deed.
Heritage's knowledge that the 10.44 acres was worth far in excess of Five F's debt
required Heritage, given its fiduciary duty to Five F as defined above, to accept the foreclosure
on the 10.44 acres as payment in full of the debt. Even if you assume that under the parties'
agreements and foreclosure law, Heritage would in the absence of a fiduciary duty been able to
bid low and then proceed to foreclose on the other parcels of collateral owned by Five F -
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everything changed when Heritage voluntarily assumed the dual role of Trustee. By so doing,
Heritage took upon itself the fiduciary duty to Five F described above and gave up itsrightsto
act without considering the "rights" or "interests" of Five F. Heritage violated this fiduciary duty
by not being satisfied with the windfall it reapedfromthe 10.44 acre foreclosure, and reaching
for and foreclosing on the extra $300,000 four-plex.
II.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Owed by Heritage to Five F
Required Heritage to Refrain From Unfairly Proceeding to Foreclose on the
$300,000 Four-plex When Heritage Knew That the 10.44 acre Foreclosure had in
Truth Fully Satisfied Five F's Debt
Judge Eves properly ruled that Five F had a reasonable expectation that Heritage would

not seek to be paid more than the amount of money that Five F owed to Heritage. The parties'
agreement was that Five F would repay the monies owed, or Heritage could foreclose on the
collateral in order to collect said unpaid monies owed.
"An examination of the express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine whether
there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." St. Benedicts
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp.. 811 P. 2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) In order for Heritage to have
complied with its implied obligation to deal fairly and in good faith with Five F, Heritage's
actions must have been consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified
expectations of Five F. "When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an
express contract, it must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith." Cook v. Zions
First National Bank, 919 P. 2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1996). "Under the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the parties constructively promise that they would not intentionally do anything to
impair the other party's right to receive thefruitsof the contract." [Citations omitted] Id,
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"Compliance with this covenant depends upon the justified expectations of the parties." Id. The
Zions First National Bank court concluded that good faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive
concepts, "and whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue,
generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." See Zions at 61.
Judge Eves incorrectly took this factually intensive issue away from the jury. The jury
could easily have concluded from the parties' agreement that Heritage could have no reasonable
expectation that it would be "fair" and in "good faith" to foreclose upon the $300,000 four-plex
after Heritage had already foreclosed upon and acquired the 10.44 acre parcel worth hundreds of
thousands of dollars more than Five F's debt. On the other hand, Five F almost certainly would
have a reasonable expectation that only enough of its collateral to actually satisfy the debt would
be foreclosed upon by Heritage. It was simply unfair for Heritage, knowing what it did, to
foreclose on anything more than the 10.44 acres.
HI.

The Strictures of Heritage's Fiduciary Duty to, and Implied Contractual Obligation
to Deal in Good Faith and Fairly with, Five F Did Not In Fact "Permit" Heritage to
do What It Did
In light of the foregoing law, it was inaccurate as a matter of law for Judge Eves to rule

that Heritage was "permitted" by the parties' agreement and the foreclosure law to "do what
Heritage did." Absent a fiduciary duty, or an obligation to deal fairly and in good faith, one
could look at the "face" of the agreement and the statute and conclude that technically Heritage
was not precluded from doing what it did.

But with fiduciary and good faith obligations

overlaying the agreements and the trustee's relationship, the strictures of these duties/obligations
are required by law to be superimposed upon the agreement, the statute and the parties' actions.
The analysis has to start with what the fiduciary and good faith obligations require - not what
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would be permitted in the absence of any such obligations. And there can be no question that
these obligations severely limited Heritage's ability to act in its own self-interest and to the
detriment of Five F once Heritage knew that the 10.44 acres had more than enough value to
satisfy the debt owed.
IV.

Unjust Enrichment Was a Fully Viable Alternative Theory of Relief
When the trial court ruled that Five F had no contractual or breach of fiduciary duty

claims against Heritage, it was improper for the court to refuse to consider Five F's unjust
enrichment alternative theory for relief.
A finder of fact could have very reasonably concluded based upon the facts as adduced by
Five F at trial that Heritage was unjustly enriched by its excessive recovery. The jury could
easily have found that a benefit was conferred on Heritage by Five F, that Heritage appreciated or
had knowledge of the benefit, and that the acceptance or retention of the benefit by Heritage was
under the circumstances inequitable unless Heritage paid Five F the value of the benefit. See
AmericanTowers Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 930 P. 2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996)
Under the undisputed facts, Heritage was unjustly enriched as to at least the value of the
$300,000 four-plex. It was simply not equitable for Five F to lose the value of that four-plex, and
for Heritage to have received it, after the 10.44 acres were foreclosed upon.
V.

This Very "Unfairness" is Protected Against in the Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute
Which Does Not Allow A Deficiency Judgment When the Fair Market Value of the
Property Foreclosed Upon Exceeds the Debt Owed
U.C.A. 57-1-32 provides that an action for what is commonly known as a "deficiency

judgment" must establish what the fair market value is of the property which was foreclosed on.
It then states that judgment may only be entered for the amount by which the debt owed exceeded
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the fair market value of the foreclosed upon property. It does not matter one wit what was "bid"
at the foreclosure sale. If the fair market value of the property foreclosed upon equaled or
exceeded the amount of the debt owed, then no judgment can be rendered.
This protects the debtorfrombeing victimized by bids which are too low and unfair.
This same policy should be applied to the present situation - especially when there are fiduciary
and good faith obligations owed by the joint trustee/beneficiary to the trustor. By bidding low in
the face of sure knowledge that the 10.44 acres were worth far in excess of Five F's debt,
Heritage essentially obtained a defacto deficiency judgment against Five F. If there had been no
additional collateral to foreclose upon, then Heritage would not have been allowed to obtain a
deficiency judgment. The result should not be different just because there was another piece of
collateral for them to try and take awayfromFive F.

SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant Five F requests that this Court reverse Judge Eves' granting of a directed
verdict in favor of Heritage, and direct the trial court on remand to enter judgmentfindingthat
Heritage's admitted actions did in fact violate itsfiduciaryduties and the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and grant judgment in favor of Five F and against Heritage for not less than the
$300,000 lost value of the unfairly foreclosed upon four-plex, plus interest thereonfromthe date
of foreclosure both before and after judgment, and for costs of suit and attorney's fees, and that
the issues of whether additional compensatory and punitive damages should be awarded be tried
before another jury with all of Judge Eves' other rulings on the law in place.
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